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THE LIFE USUFRUCT AS AN ESTATE
PLANNING TOOL
Introduction
The marital deduction originally was enacted to equalize the estate
and gift tax consequences of property transfers made between married
persons living in community property states with those transfers made
between married persons living in non-community property states.' Because
of this underlying purpose, community property was not eligible for the
marital deduction,2 and where the marital deduction could be claimed,
it was limited to one-half of the decendent's adjusted gross estate.3
However, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA)4 changed the
underlying rationale of the marital deduction. The marital deduction's
primary objective is no longer to equalize the transfer tax consequences
to married couples regardless of their domicile, but is to allow an in-
dividual to transfer his entire estate to his surviving spouse without the
Copyright 1984, by Louisiana Law Review.
1. S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1948 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 1163, 1163; United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 84 S. Ct. 248 (1963); Note,
The Qualified Terminable Interest Rule: An Overview, 34 U. Fla. L. Rev. 737 (1982). The
inequity between community property states and non-community property states can be il-
lustrated as follows. A, the wage earning spouse in a non-community property state dies
leaving B, the surviving spouse, one-half of the estate. A's entire estate generally would
be subject to federal estate tax at the time of his death. The property bequeathed to B,
one-half of the property accumulated during marriage, again would be subject to tax at
the time of B's death, if B retained the property or its value. On the other hand, if A
and B were residents of a community property state, only one-half of the property, A's
community interest, would be subject to estate tax at A's death. By operation of state law,
B would own the remaining one-half of the property acquired during marriage which would
be subject to estate tax at B's death. Thus a surviving spouse domiciled in a non-community
property state receives one-half of the property accumulated during marriage after estate
taxes have been paid, while a surviving spouse domiciled in a community property state
receives one-half of the property accumulated during the marriage tax free. The marital
deduction as originally enacted corrected this inequity by allowing a limited deduction in
the estate of the first spouse to die for property passing to the surviving spouse. (This
example ignores the effect of the Credit for Tax on Prior Transfers provided for in I.R.C.
§ 2013 (1982)).
2. I.R.C. § 2056(c) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (as it appeared prior to its repeal in 1981).
3. Id. § 2056(c)(1)(A).
4. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981) (codified
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1982), I.R.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1982)).
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imposition of any estate or gift tax.' This has been accomplished by remov-
ing the quantitative limitations on the marital deduction6 and, in order
to encourage its use, by enacting an additional exception to the "terminable
interest rule."'
Prior to the enactment of ERTA, the general rule was that no marital
deduction was allowed when an interest in property passed to the spouse
if the spouse's right to such property terminated upon any contingency,
the lapse of time, or the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an event.' The
rule disallowing a deduction for "terminable interest," however, contained
certain limited exceptions. The first exception was that an interest was
not considered terminable if the surviving spouse's interest would fail upon
the surviving spouse's death within six months of the deceased spouse's
death. The second exception occurred if the legacy to the spouse would
fail if the spouses died in a common disaster, and the contingency did
not in fact occur.' The third exception to the terminable interest rule
allowed the marital deduction when the surviving spouse had a life in-
terest coupled with the power to appoint the underlying property to himself
or his estate." The final exception dealt with life insurance proceeds or
payments under an annuity contract if the surviving spouse had the power
to appoint all or a specific portion of the amounts held by the insurer
to himself or his estate."
ERTA does not change the "terminable interest rule" but merely adds
an additional exception. This exceptibn allows "qualified terminable in-
terest property" (QTIP) to qualify for the marital deduction if three re-
quirements are met: (1) the property passes from the decedent; (2) the
surviving spouse has a qualifying income interest for life; and (3) the ex-
ecutor timely and properly elects to treat the transfer as a qualifying ter-
minable interest. 2 Under this new rule, a spouse can dispose of the naked
ownership of his property as he desires and still obtain the benefits of
the marital deduction on the entire property if he grants a qualifying life
interest to his surviving spouse.
5. H.R. Rep. No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 127, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 228.
6. I.R.C. § 2056(a) (1982).
7. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1982).
8. I.R.C. § 2056(b) (1982).
9. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(3) (1982).
10. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) (1982).
11. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(6) (1982).
12. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1982). An election by the executor merely defers the estate
tax until the death of the surviving spouse. Also, there may be cases where QTIP treatment
is available, but would not be advisable. This paper only addresses the availability of the
deduction. See Blackstone, More on the Marital Deduction: Choosing Between Outright
vs. Life Usufruct vs. QTIP Trust, 31 La. B.J. 335 (1984).
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The most onerous of the QTIP requirements is that the interest be
a "qualifying income interest," which requires that several tests be
satisfied. First, the interest must exist for the life of the spouse. 3 Since
a legal usufruct which arises by operation of Louisiana law terminates
upon remarriage,' 4 it normally would not be a qualifying income interest
eligible for the marital deduction. Similarly, neither a usufruct for a term
of years determined other than by the death of the surviving spouse, nor
one subject to a resolutory condition would qualify."
The second requirement for a "qualifying income interest" is that
the surviving spouse be entitled to all of the income or a specific portion
of the income from the interest transferred.' 6 The surviving spouse's rights
are determined by the governing instrument and, if the instrument is silent,
by state law.' 7 These rights must be sufficient to meet the requirements
for a marital deduction trust, 8 i.e., a trust which gives to the surviving
spouse substantially that degree of beneficial enjoyment which the law
of trusts accords to a person who is unqualifiedly designated as the life
beneficiary of a trust.' 9 The required degree of enjoyment exists if the
surviving spouse is entitled to income or has such use of the property
as is consistent both with the value of the trust corpus and with its
preservation.2" The QTIP rules do not require that the surviving spouse
have the power to invade the corpus of the property,2' nor that the in-
come interest be placed in trust in order to qualify for the marital
deduction.22 The deduction is not allowed if the primary purpose of the
trust is to safeguard the corpus without providing the surviving spouse
the beneficial enjoyment of the property.23
The third requirement is fairly mechanical, and requires the income
to be paid at least annually.2 ' An interest does not fail to meet this con-
dition merely because the spouse is not entitled to the income during the
administration of the estate assets, unless the executor is authorized by
13. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii) (1982).
14. La. Civ. Code art. 890.
15. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii) (1982).
16. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(1) (1982).
17. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(2) (1958), in 1958-2 C.B. 575.
18. See generally H.R. Rep. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1981), reprinted in 1981
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 105 [hereinafter cited as ERTA Report]. The Report refers
to Treasury Regulation § 20.2056(b)-5(f) (1958). But see R. Stephens, G. Maxfield & S.
Lind, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation § 5.06[6][b] (4th ed. 1978) (criticizing the regulation
regarding the rule on unproductive property, since no such limitation appears in the statute).
19. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(l) (1958), in 1958-2 C.B. 574.
20. Id.
21. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1982).
22. See generally ERTA Report, supra note 18.
23. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(5) (1958), in 1958-2 C.B. 576.
24. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(1) (1982).
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the decedent's will to delay the distribution beyond a reasonable period.2"
The final requirement for a "qualifying income interest" is that no
person have the power to appoint any part of the property to any person
other than the surviving spouse.26 The legislative history indicates that
a remainderman's right to transfer his interest does not disqualify the prop-
erty, provided the spouse's income interest is not affected by the transfer.27
The property rights of a remainderman are analogous to the rights of
a naked owner; " hence, the power of a naked owner to dispose of his
interest subject to the usufruct should not be. considered as a power to
appoint the property to a person other than the surviving spouse.
Under the Louisiana Civil Code, the surviving spouse obtains a legal
usufruct over community property inherited by the descendents if the prop-
erty is not adversely disposed of by testament.29 The deceased spouse may
go further, however, and confirm the usufruct for the life of the surviv-
ing spouse over his share of community property, as well as his separate
property, without impinging upon the legitime of the forced heirs.30
The ability of a testator to confirm the usufruct for life naturally
raises the question of whether such a testamentary usufruct is a "qualify-
ing income interest" eligible for the marital deduction. The essential con-
dition for qualifying for QTIP treatment is that the surviving spouse have
a nonterminable right to enjoy the income from the property. A usufruct
confirmed for the life of the usufructuary is nonterminable and easily
meets this requirement of the legislation. The major problem is determin-
ing whether the usufructuary has the requisite degree of "income interest."
The usufructuary's right to enjoy the income from the property subject
to the usufruct and the usufructuary's right to change the character of
the property in order to make it "productive" must be examined to deter-
mine whether the usufructuary enjoys a requisite "income interest." Ad-
ditionally, it is necessary to consider whether a testamentary grant to the
surviving spouse of the power to convert nonconsumables is an impinge-
ment upon the legitime of the forced heirs.
Internal Revenue Service Approach
Prior to the enactment of Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section
2056(b)(7), a life usufruct of both consumables and nonconsumables was
considered a terminable interest ineligible for the marital deduction since
25. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(9) (1958), in 1958-2 C.B. 577.
26. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(11) (1982).
27. Staff Joint Comm. on Taxation, Explanation of Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. at 235-36 (1981).
28. See Rev. Rul. 74-273, 1974-1 C.B. 201.
29. La. Civ. Code art. 890.
30. La. Civ. Code art. 890.
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the surviving spouse's interest terminated upon his death. 3' Additionally,
the testamentary usufruct did not fall within the exception to the terminable
interest rule contained in IRC section 2056(b)(5), because of the usufruc-
tuary's duty to account to the naked owner at the termination of the
usufruct, and the exclusion of the value of the underlying property sub-
ject to the usufruct from the second spouse's estate.32 However, it is no
longer necessary that the surviving spouse have an interest in the corpus
equivalent to ownership in order for the interest to qualify as an excep-
tion to the terminable interest rule. QTIP requires only that the surviving
spouse receive a nonterminable income interest. Because of this major
change, the rationale of the prior jurisprudence does not apply.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has addressed the question of
whether a testamentary usufruct confirmed for life qualifies for QTIP
treatment in several recent Private Letter Rulings. 3 Although these rul-
ings apply only to the individual requesting them and cannot be cited
as precedent by other taxpayers,34 they do give an indication of the cur-
rent views of the IRS. In each ruling, the issue before the IRS was whether
a usufruct over consumables and nonconsumables was a qualifying in-
come interest eligible for QTIP treatment when the usufruct was confirmed
for life, but the usufructuary was not granted the right to dispose of,
alienate, or sell nonconsumable property.
The IRS's initial approach was to separately consider the usufruct
over consumables and nonconsumables, and then to further subdivide
property into productive and nonproductive. The IRS concluded that, in
the case of consumables, the property qualified regardless of whether the
property was productive or nonproductive, since the usufructuary has the
immediate right to consume, alienate or encumber the property-qualified
only by the statutory obligation to account to the naked owner at the
termination of the usufruct. The duty to account was not considered as
impeding the usufructuary's beneficial enjoyment of the lifetime interest.35
In the case of nonconsumables, however, the IRS hinged the qualifica-
tion for QTIP treatment upon a determination of whether or not the prop-
erty was productive or nonproductive.36 Nonproductive nonconsumables
did not qualify for QTIP treatment under the IRS's opinion, since the
31. Stewart v. Usry, 399 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1968); Hickey, The Usufruct and Taxation,
8 La. B.J. 223, 224 (1961); Hickey, The Usufruct and Taxation, (Second Edition), 22 La.
B.J. 261 (1975); see also Liebman v. Fontenot, 275 F. 688 (W.D. La. 1921).
32. Stewart v. Usry, 399 F.2d at 58.
33. Priv. Letter Rul. 8339018, 1983 Priv. Letter Rul. (P-H) 4655;.Priv. Letter Rul.
8325056 1983, Priv. Letter Rul. (P-H) 2868; Priv. Letter Rul. 8312018, 1983 Priv. Letter
Rul. (P-H) 1394; Priv. Letter Rul. 8304040, 1983 Priv. Letter Rul. (P-H) 453.
34. 1.R.C. § 6110(J)(3) (1982).
35. See Private Letter Rulings cited supra note 33.
36. Id.
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surviving spouse was not provided with the requisite degree of income.37
Residential property, although not "productive," qualified for QTIP treat-
ment since the surviving spouse has beneficial use and enjoyment of the
property consistent with its nature.3"
In light of the IRS's productive/nonproductive dichotomy, it is
necessary to consider whether the property must be productive at the'in-
ception of the usufruct, or whether it is only necessary that the property
can be made productive within a reasonable period of time. The first
Private Letter Ruling on this topic required that nonconsumable property
be productive at the inception of the usufruct.39 In a later ruling, however,
the IRS stated that nonproductive nonconsumable property did not qualify
for QTIP treatment unless the spouse could either in fact make the prop-
erty productive or derive the requisite degree of beneficial enjoyment con-
sistent with the value of the asset." It is not clear if the IRS, by using
different language in the later ruling, intended to change the time at which
to evaluate the productive quality of an asset.
Requiring that the property be productive at the inception of the
usufruct could affect the availability of QTIP treatment in certain in-
stances. This would occur, for example, if property was unproductive in
fact at the date of death, but could easily be made productive within
a reasonable period of time. If the relevant time to evaluate the property
is at the inception of the usufruct, this property would not qualify for
QTIP treatment, while if the relevant time is within a reasonable period
after death, the property would qualify.
The correct approach should be to allow QTIP treatment when the
usufructuary can either in fact make the property productive, or can derive
the requisite degree of beneficial enjoyment consistent with the value of
the asset within a reasonable period of time after the inception of the
usufruct. This is the result reached under the regulations dealing with
marital deduction trusts, which allow the marital deduction on nonproduc-
tive assets placed in trust if the trustee has the power to make the prop-
erty productive within a reasonable period of time."' That the property
be productive on the date of the decedent's death is not necessary.
37. Id.
38. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(4) (1958), in 1958-2 C.B. 575. The same reasoning
should apply to jewelry and furs. See Edelman, Reducing Estate Tax, 30 La. B.J. 213,
214 (1982).
39. Priv. Letter Rul. 8304040, 1983 Priv. Letter Rul. (P-H) 453.
40. Priv. Letter Rul. 8325056, 1983 Priv. Letter Rul. (P-H) 2868.
41. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(4) (1958), in 1958-2 C.B. 575.
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Property Rights of the Usufructuary
The emphasis placed by the IRS in allowing the deduction on the
usufructuary's ability to make the property productive requires an examina-
tion of the rights of the usufructuary under Louisiana law. The usufruc-
tuary has the right to use the thing which, in principle, is as extensive
as that of an owner, 2 and has absolute ownership of the natural and
civil fruits produced.43 This right can be exercised by the usufructuary
personally, or through other persons to whom the right is transferred."
Consumable property is property which cannot be enjoyed without
being consumed or expended, or without its substance being changed."5
Examples of consumables are money, stocks of merchandise, certificates
of deposit, and beverages. 4 Nonconsumable property is property which
may be enjoyed without altering its substance, although its substance may
be diminished or deteriorated naturally by time or by use. 7 Except for
the case of corporeal movables that are gradually and substantially im-
paired by use, wear, or decay, 8 or where the right has been expressly
granted,"9 the usufructuary does not have the right to dispose of noncon-
sumable things." Examples of nonconsumables are land, houses, shares
of stock, and furniture."
Under the IRS's approach, the focus in determining whether prop-
erty qualifies for QTIP treatment is the ability of the usufructuary to
make nonconsumable property "productive." The usufructuary generally
has the power to make property subject to the usufruct productive. 2 For
example, the usufructuary can grant an agricultural lease, 3 or any other
type of lease, on previously nonproductive property. The usufructuary
also appears to have greater power to make the property productive under
article 558 (as revised in 1976) than previously existed. This article allows
the usufructuary, with court approval, to make those improvements and
alterations that a prudent administrator would make, even if they change
the destination of the property, provided that they do not change the
42. A. Yiannopoulos, Personal Servitudes § 21, in 3 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d
ed. 1978).
43. La. Civ. Code art. 550.
44. A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 42, § 40.
45. La. Civ. Code art. 536.
46. La. Civ. Code art. 536. See also Vivian State Bank v. Thomason-Lewis Lumber
Co., 162 La. 660, 111 So. 51 (1926).
47. La. Civ. Code art. 537.
48. La. Civ. Code art. 568.
49. La. Civ. Code art. 539, comment c; see also La. Civ. Code art. 568.
50. La. Civ. Code art. 568.
51. La. Civ. Code art. 537.
52. For a discussion of special problems arising out of mineral properties, see infra
text accompanying notes 63-64.
53. McDaniel v. Ortego, 365 So. 2d 1159 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
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substance of the property. 4 Given the broad powers of the usufructuary,
the only limitation to making nonconsumable property "productive" may
be the nature of the property involved.
Type of Property May Determine Result
The power of the usufructuary to make nonconsumables productive,
or income producing, may depend upon whether the property is unimproved
real estate, mineral property, or stock. For example, if the nonproductive
nonconsumable is an undeveloped tract of land, the usufructuary can easily
make the property productive and meet the income requirement of the QTIP
provisions by granting a predial lease.5
If the nonproductive property is stock in a closely held corporation
that historically has not paid dividends, different considerations arise. The
usufructuary has the power to vote shares subject to the usufruct. 6 If
the usufructuary has effective voting control over the corporation by com-
bining any shares owned by him with the voting rights obtained by virtue
of the usufruct, then he should be considered as having the power to
make the property productive for QTIP purposes. This conclusion is
reached since the usufructuary has the power to control the Board of
Directors, which determines whether dividends should beopaid.5 7 Even with
effective control, however, special problems may arise when there are
limitations on the corporation's ability to pay dividends. These would arise
when there are no earnings and profits, 8 or when restrictions are placed
on dividend payments in the articles of incorporation, 9 or when the pay-
ment would violate the directors' duty owed to the corporation and its
shareholders." The most recent Private Letter Ruling states that when
the property becomes productive during the term of the usufruct, 61 QTIP
treatment is available. In cases where impediments to dividend payments
exist, the determination of whether the interest will in fact be made pro-
ductive, and thus be eligible for QTIP treatment, should depend on the
economic prospects that the corporation will pay dividends.
Another situation in which the usufructuary may not be able to make
property productive may occur when the usufructuary has a minority in-
terest in the corporation. Here, the usufructuary does not have effective
54. La. Civ. Code art. 558; A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 42, § 63, at 264. The destina-
tion of the property also can be changed, of course, if the consent of the naked owner
is obtained. La. Civ. Code art. 558.
55. McDaniel v. Ortego, 365 So. 2d 1159 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
56. La. Civ. Code art. 553.
57. La. Business Corporation Law: La. R.S. 12:63 (1969) [hereinafter cited as La. Bus.
Corp. Law].
58. La. Bus. Corp. Law § 63.
59. La. Bus. Corp. Law § 63.
60. La. Bus. Corp. Law § 91.
61. Priv. Letter Rul. 8339018, 1983 Priv. Letter Rul. (P-H) 4655.
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control over the board of directors. The ability of the minority shareholders
to compel dividend payments, or to force a liquidation of the corpora-
tion, is severely limited.6 2 This lack of power to make the property pro-
ductive may disqualify the interest from QTIP treatment.
Mineral interests also present special problems. Land, as well as
mineral rights segregated from the land, may be the object of a usufruct.
The usufruct of land generally does not include the right of use and en-
joyment of the minerals63 unless an "open mine" exists on the property
at the time of the creation of the usufruct" or the right to use and enjoy
the minerals has been expressly granted.6" Thus, if the usufruct of land
does not include mineral rights, the usufructuary can not lease the prop-
erty for mineral development, and, except in the case of coal or lignite,
the naked owner has the same rights to minerals that he would have if
the land was not subject to the usufruct. 6
The usufructuary of mineral rights, as distinguished from the usufruc-
tuary of land, is entitled to all the benefits of use and enjoyment that
would accrue to him if he were the owner of the right.67 The usufruc-
tuary of a servitude, therefore, can grant a mineral lease that extends
beyond the term of the usufruct and binds the naked owner.6"
Land which is unproductive at the creation of the usufruct, and which
because of its nature can only be made productive by mineral exploita-
tion, will not qualify for QTIP treatment since the naked owner is the
only person who has the power to make the property productive. QTIP
treatment should be available, however, if the usufruct over the land in-
cludes the right of use and enjoyment of the minerals, or if the usufruct
is over mineral rights since the usufructuary then has the power to make
the property productive.
Right of Conversion
Nonconsumable property which will not in fact become productive
clearly can qualify for QTIP treatment if the surviving spouse is given
62. Streb v. Abramson-Caro Clinic, 401 So. 2d 410 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981) (denying
attempt to compel a liquidation); Gruenberg v. Goldmine Plantation, Inc., 304 So. 2d 873
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) (denying attempt to compel a liquidation); La. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 143. There may be a fiduciary duty owed by a director to pay sufficient dividends to
avoid the accumulated earnings tax imposed by I.R.C. §§ 531-537 (1982). But see Levy
v. Billeaud, 443 So. 2d 539 (La. 1983) (finding that the majority shareholders of a liquidating
corporation owe a fiduciary duty to the ntinority shareholders).
63. La. Mineral Code: La. R.S. 31:188 (1975) [hereinafter cited as La. Min. Code].
64. La. Min. Code art. 190 & comment; La. Min. Code art. 191 (Supp. 1984).
65. La. Min. Code art. 189.
66. La. Min. Code art. 195 (Supp. 1984).
67. La. Min. Code art. 193 (Supp. 1984).
68. La. Min. Code arts. 16 118; A. Yiannopoulos, supra note 42, § 28, at 14.
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the right to convert nonconsumables into consumables. 69 This right gives
the surviving spouse the power equivalent to that granted to the trustee
of a qualifying marital deduction trust. Unfortunately, this solution may
create another problem.70 Some writers have suggested that the right of
the surviving spouse to convert nonconsumables into consumables impinges
upon the legitime of the forced heirs." The essence of the argument is
that the grant of the power of conversion in the testament exceeds the
authority granted by Louisiana Civil Code article 890 and constitutes the
grant of an additional right to the surviving spouse. Article 890 allows
the surviving spouse to have a usufruct over community and separate prop-
erty without impinging upon the legitime, but it does not give the surviving
spouse the right of conversion. This argument is consistent with Succes-
sion of Waldron," in which the court said that if the rights granted the
usufructuary by will exceed the rights that would have been granted by
operation of law, then the usufruct is a testamentary one, and must be
examined to determine if it impinges upon the legitime."
Another argument supports the position that the right of conversion
impinges upon the legitime. A surviving spouse who has the power to
convert nonconsumables into consumables can expend the property, but
must account to the naked owner for its value at the termination of the
usufruct." The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated, however, that a
forced heir has an interest in property, not value. 5 The effect of granting
69. See Private Letter Rulings cited supra note 33.
70. The right of the surviving spouse to convert nonconsumables into consumables may
also present a problem in the area of state inheritance taxes. A surviving spouse's legal
usufruct over the deceased spouse's community property is not subject to Louisiana in-
heritance taxes, since the usufructuary's interest is acquired through the marriage contract
by operation of law rather than by inheritance. The Louisiana Department of Revenue has
taken the position that the exemption .is not available when the spouse obtains a testamen-
tary usufruct rather than a legal one, Succession of Lynch, 145 So. 42 (La. App. Orl. 1932);
however, the confirmation of a legal usufruct by testament is considered to be a legal usufruct
and therefore is exempt from inheritance taxes. Succession of Brown, 94 So. 2d 317 (La.
App. Orl. 1957).
In Succession of Lynch, the issue was whether the confirmation of a usufruct for the
life of the surviving spouse was a testamentary usufruct subject to Louisiana inheritance
taxes. The court found that it was unnecessary to decide this issue since the only additional
property right transferred to the surviving spouse was the right of remarriage, a right that
could not be valued. It can be argued that the right of conversion gives the surviving spouse
a right in excess of that granted by the operation of law and that to the extent it can
be valued it is subject to state inheritance taxes. See also Succession of Chauvin, 260 La.
828, 257 So. 2d 422 (1972).
71. A. Rubin & G. LeVan, Louisiana Wills and Trusts, LWC § 2.2, at 509 (1982);
Edelman, supra note 38, at 216 n.25.
72. 323 So. 2d 434 (La. 1975).
73. Id.
74. Heirs of Michel v. Knox, 34 La. Ann. 399 (1882); La. Civ. Code art. 538.
75. Succession of Hyde, 292 So. 2d 693 (La. 1974); see also Succession of Williams,
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the surviving spouse the right to convert nonconsumables into consumables
is to satisfy the legitime with value rather than property.
One argument supporting the position that the right of conversion
does not impinge upon the legitime is that the surviving spouse and the
forced heirs are in the same position with respect to the converted assets
as they are with respect to consumables owned by the deceased spouse
on the date of death.7 6 Furthermore, analogous situations arise where the
usufruct continues on nonconsumables without an impingement on the
legitime. This occurs when the property is destroyed due to the fault of
a third person,77 or when the property changes form without any act of
the usufructuary."8
Use of a Qualified Disclaimer
A legal usufruct in Louisiana created by operation of law over com-
munity property terminates upon the remarriage of the surviving spouse,
and unless confirmed for the life of the surviving spouse, does not qualify
for QTIP treatment. At first glance this appears to preclude all intestate
successions and all testate successions where the usufruct was not con-
firmed for life. But would a disclaimer by the naked owner of the right
to have the usufruct terminate upon remarriage cure the terminable nature
of the legal usufruct, and thus qualify the usufruct under the QTIP pro-
visions? The answer, of course, is not clear.
A "qualified disclaimer" is a complete and unqualified refusal to ac-
cept some or all of the rights to which one is entitled either by bequest
or by operation of law. 9 Generally, the release of a right or interest in
property is considered a taxable transfer, but the exception contained in
IRC section 2518 provides that a person who makes a "qualified
disclaimer" is not treated as having made a taxable transfer to the person
to whom the disclaimed interest passes. Rather, the interest is treated as.
devolving directly from the decedent. To qualify, the disclaimer must be
irrevocable, unqualified, and filed in writing not later than nine months
184 So. 2d 70, 73 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966). The underlying premise of Succession of Williams
may have been overruled by the amendments to Civil Code articles 1505 and 1573. Article
1505 now allows the forced portion to be satisfied with life insurance proceeds or proceeds
from pension and profit sharing plans.
76. A different result would be reached if, in addition to the right to convert noncon-
sumables into consumables, the surviving spouse was relieved of the obligation to account
to the naked owner. Here, the rights of the usufructuary are as extensive as those of an
owner, and could possibly impinge upon the legitime of the forced heirs. See A. Yian-
nopoulos, supra note 42, § 21, at n.14.
77. La. Civ. Code art. 614.
78. La. Civ. Code art. 615.
79. Prop. Treas. Reg. 20.2056(d)-2, 45 Fed. Reg. 48,923 (1980) (Proposed Treasury
Regulations are also available in 3 Fed. Est..& Gift Tax Rep. (CCH) 11,800 (1983).).
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after the date on which the transfer creating the interest is made, or the
day on which the disclaimant reaches twenty-one, whichever comes later."0
Additionally, the disclaimant must not have accepted any of the benefits
from the disclaimed interest, and the interest must pass either to the sur-
viving spouse or to someone other than the disclaimant. 8 ' Property which
passes to the surviving spouse by virtue of a qualified disclaimer qualifies
for the marital deduction since the property is considered as passing directly
from the deceased to the surviving spouse.2
The proposed regulations, which were issued prior to the enactment
of the QTIP provisions, treat the income interest as one property interest,
and the corpus as a separate property interest.8 3 The regulations provide,
however, that if state law merges the separate property interests they are
merged for federal tax purposes. Where state law recognizes the separate
property interests and they are not in trust, a beneficiary can make a
qualified disclaimer of either the income interest or the remainder interest
without disclaiming the other.8 " Where state law merges the interests, par-
tial disclaimers are not permitted; a disclaimer of the income interest does
not qualify under section 2518, unless the remainder interest also is
disclaimed.8
The IRS recently addressed the question of whether a trust would
be eligible for QTIP treatment if the legatee irrevocably and unqualifiedly
renounced the right to invade the corpus of a trust during the lifetime
of the surviving spouse but the legatee did not renounce the right to receive
the corpus of the trust on the death of the surviving spouse.8 6 The trust
was created under a will where the intent of the testator was to create
a QTIP trust, but this was not accomplished due to drafting errors. The
IRS concluded that the limited renunciation cured the defect in the trust
and that it qualified for QTIP treatment. 7
The major hurdle in reaching this result was the requirement that all
beneficial rights in the corpus be renounced in order for the disclaimer
to be effective. This apparent problem was overcome, however, by find-
ing that all beneficial rights treated as passing from the decedent had been
disclaimed. The legatee's beneficial right to the corpus of the trust pass-
ing upon the death of the surviving spouse was treated as passing directly
to the legatee from the surviving spouse because of IRC section 2044(c).
80. Prop. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-2(a), 45 Fed. Reg. 48,926 (1980).
81. Id.
82. Prop. Treas. Reg. 20.2056(d)-l(b), 45 Fed. Reg. 48,923 (1980).
83. Prop. Treas. Reg. 25.2518-3(a)(1), 45 Fed. Reg. 48,929 (1980).
84. Id.
85. Id. Different rules apply when the interest is placed in trust. Prop. Treas. Reg.
25.2518-3(a)(2), 45 Fed. Reg. 48,929 (1980).
86. Priv. Letter Rul. 8337069.
87. Id.
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Section 2044(c) provides that an interest to which the QTIP provisions
apply shall be includable in the gross estate of the surviving spouse, and
shall be considered as passing directly from the surviving spouse.
The logic of the IRS should be recounted. First, the IRS stated that
upon the legatee is renouncing the right to invade the corpus during the
lifetime of the surviving spouse, no one can any longer appoint any part
of the property to a person other than the surviving spouse. Secondly,
because the QTIP requirements were now met, the corpus of the prop-
erty passed directly to the legatee from the surviving spouse. And finally,
no partial disclaimer resulted, since all interests treated as passing from
the decedent to the legatee were disclaimed.
The rationale of this ruling should apply by analogy to the case of
the naked owner who disclaims the right to have the usufruct terminate
upon remarriage of the surviving spouse. Since the disclaimer removes
the terminable nature of the legal usufruct, the interest should be eligible
for QTIP treatment. Additionally, by treating property subject to the QTIP
provisions as passing directly from the surviving spouse, all rights passing
from the decedent are disclaimed, and therefore, no partial disclaimer
results.
Conclusion
A usufruct confirmed for the life of the surviving spouse should
qualify for the exception to the terminable interest rule under the newly
enacted QTIP provisions. The treatment should be available whether the
underlying property subject to the usufruct is consumable or noncon-
sumable, provided however, that the property will in fact be productive
within a reasonable period of time after the inception of the usufruct.
The legislature should address the question of whether the power of the
usufructuary to convert nonconsumables into consumables is an impinge-
ment upon the legitime of the forced heirs. Additionally, QTIP treatment
should be available in intestate successions or testamentary successions
through the use of a qualified disclaimer by the naked owner even though
the surviving spouse was not granted the usufruct for life.
Randy Paul Roussel
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